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Abstract
We study the randomized query complexity of approximate Nash equilibria (ANE) in large
games. We prove that, for some constant ǫ > 0, any randomized oracle algorithm that com-
putes an ǫ-ANE in a binary-action, n-player game must make 2Ω(n/ logn) payoff queries. For the
stronger solution concept of well-supported Nash equilibria (WSNE), Babichenko [Bab14] previ-
ously gave an exponential 2Ω(n) lower bound for the randomized query complexity of ǫ-WSNE,
for some constant ǫ > 0; the same lower bound was shown to hold for ǫ-ANE, but only when
ǫ = O(1/n).
Our result answers an open problem posed by Hart and Nisan in [HN13] and by Babichenko in
[Bab14], and is very close to the trivial upper bound of 2n. Our proof relies on a generic reduction
from the problem of finding an ǫ-WSNE to the problem of finding an ǫ/(4α)-ANE, in large games
with α actions, which might be of independent interest.
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1 Introduction
The celebrated theorem of Nash [Nas50] states that every finite game has an equilibrium point. The
solution concept of Nash equilibrium (NE) has been tremendously influential in economics and social
sciences ever since (e.g. see [HR04]). The complexity and efficient approximation of NE have been
studied intensively during the past decade, and much progress has been made (e.g., see [LMM03;
AKV05; BVV05; KT07; TS07; DGP09; CDT09; EY10; Meh14; DP15; BPR15; CDO15; DKT15;
Rub15; DKS15; Bar15]).
In this paper, we study the randomized query complexity of computing an ǫ-approximate Nash
equilibrium (ANE) in large games, for some constant ǫ > 0. Given a game G with n players and α
actions for each player, we index the players by the set [n] = {1, . . . , n} and index the actions by
the set [α] = {1, . . . , α}. Recall that an ǫ-ANE of G is a mixed strategy profile
x = (x1, . . . ,xn), where xi ∈ [0, 1]
α sums to 1 for each i ∈ [n],
in which each player i plays an ǫ-best response xi to other players’ strategies x−i
1 (see the precise
definition in Section 2). Since the notion of ANE (as well as that of well-supported Nash equilibria
to be discussed below) is additive, we always assume that the payoff functions of games considered
throughout this paper take values between 0 and 1.
For the (payoff) query model, an oracle algorithm with unlimited computational power is given
an approximation parameter ǫ, the number of players n and the number of actions α in an unknown
game G, and needs to find an ǫ-ANE of G. The algorithm has oracle access to the payoff functions
of players in G: For each round, the algorithm can adaptively query a pure strategy profile a ∈ [α]n,
and receives the payoff of every player with respect to a. We are interested in the number of queries
needed by any randomized oracle algorithm for this task. Note that a trivial upper bound is αn, by
simply querying all the pure strategy profiles.
Prior Results and Related Work
The query complexity of (approximate) Nash equilibria and related solution concepts has received
considerable attention recently, e.g. see [FGGS13; HN13; FS14; GR14; Bab14; BB15; GT15]. Below
we review results that are most relevant to our work.
The query complexity of (approximate) correlated equilibria 2 (CE) is well understood. For
the (payoff) query model considered here, randomized algorithms exist (e.g., regret-minimizing
algorithms [HMC00; Har05; BM07]) for finding an ǫ-CE using poly(1/ǫ, α, n) many queries. It turns
out that both randomization and approximation are necessary. Babichenko and Barman in [BB15]
first showed that every deterministic algorithm that finds an exact CE requires exponentially many
queries in n. Hart and Nisan [HN13] then showed that the same exponential lower bound holds for
any deterministic algorithm for (1/2)-CE and any randomized algorithm for exact CE. Now for the
stronger (expected payoff) query model, where the oracle returns the expected payoffs of any mixed
strategy profile 3, Papadimitriou and Roughgarden [PR08] and Jiang and Leyton-Brown [JL11] gave
1We follow the convention and write x−i := (x1, . . . ,xi−1,xi+1, . . . ,xn), strategies of players other than i in x.
2An ǫ-correlated equilibrium is a probability distribution over pure strategy profiles, i.e. [α]n, such that any player
unilaterally deviating from strategies drawn from it can increase her expected payoff by no more than ǫ.
3Such an oracle can be implemented in polynomial time for many classes of succinct games; see [PR08].
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a deterministic algorithm that computes an exact CE in polynomial time using polynomially many
queries (both in α and n).
Turning to the harder, but perhaps more interesting, problem of approximating Nash equilibria
under the payoff query model, the deterministic lower bound of [HN13] for (1/2)-CE directly implies
the same bound for (1/2)-ANE, since any ǫ-ANE by definition is also an ǫ-CE. For the randomized
query complexity of NE, Babichenko [Bab14] showed that any randomized algorithm requires 2Ω(n)
queries to find an ǫ-well-supported Nash equilibrium (WSNE), in a binary-action, n-player game
(see Theorem 1.4). Recall that an ǫ-WSNE of a game is a mixed strategy profile x in which the
probability of player i playing action j is positive only when action j is an ǫ-best response with
respect to x−i (see Section 2 for the precise definition). By definition, an ǫ-WSNE is also an ǫ-ANE
but the inverse is not true. Following a well-known connection between WSNE and ANE [DGP09]
(and using random samples to approximate expected payoffs), Babichenko [Bab14] showed that the
same 2Ω(n) bound holds for the randomized query complexity of ǫ-ANE, but only when ǫ = O(1/n).
The randomized query complexity of ǫ-ANE in large games, an arguably more natural relaxation of
exact NE compared to WSNE, remains an open problem when ǫ > 0 is a constant.
Our Results
For binary-action, n-player games, we show that 2Ω(n/ logn) queries are required for any randomized
algorithm to find an ǫ-ANE, for some constant ǫ > 0. To state the result, we use QCp(ANE(n, ǫ)),
for some p > 0, to denote the smallest T such that there exists a randomized oracle algorithm that
uses no more than T queries and outputs an ǫ-ANE with probability at least p, given any unknown
binary-action, n-player game. Our main result is the following lower bound on QCp(ANE(n, ǫ)):
Theorem 1.1 (Main). There exist two constants ǫ > 0 and c > 0 such that
QCp(ANE(n, ǫ)) = 2
Ω(n/ logn), where p = 2−cn/ logn.
Our lower bound answers an open problem posed by Hart and Nisan [HN13] and by Babichenko
[Bab14]. Our result shows that, in terms of their query complexities, finding an ǫ-ANE is almost as
hard as finding an ǫ-WSNE in a large game, even for constant ǫ > 0. It also implies the following
corollary regarding the rate of convergence of k-queries dynamics (see [Bab14] for the definition).
Corollary 1.2. There exist two constants ǫ > 0 and c > 0 such that no k-queries dynamic can
converge to an ǫ-ANE in 2Ω(n/ logn)/k steps with probability at least 2−cn/log n in all binary-action
and n-player games.
In addition to the randomized query complexity, our proof of Theorem 1.1 yields a polynomial-
time reduction4 from the problem of finding an ǫ-WSNE to that of finding an (ǫ′ = Ω(ǫ))-ANE in a
succinct game with a fixed number of actions. Following the definition from [PR08], we say that an
α-action succinct game is a pair (n,U), where n is the number of players and U is a (multi-output)
Boolean circuit that, given a pure strategy profile a ∈ [α]n (encoded in binary), outputs the payoffs
of all n players with respect to a in the game. We show that
4Recall that a polynomial-time reduction from total search problem A to total search problem B is a pair (f, g) of
polynomial-time computable functions such that: 1) for every input instance x of A, f(x) is an input instance of B;
2) for every solution y to f(x) in B, g(y) is a solution to x in A.
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Theorem 1.3. Let ǫ ≥ 0 and α ∈ N be two constants. Then the problem of finding an ǫ-WSNE is
polynomial-time reducible to that of finding an ǫ/(4α)-ANE, both in an α-action succinct game.
Approximate vs Well-Supported Nash Equilibria
Let QCp(WSNE(n, ǫ)), for some p > 0, denote the smallest T such that there exists a randomized
oracle algorithm that uses no more than T queries and outputs an ǫ-WSNE with probability at least
p, given any unknown binary-action, n-player game. Babichenko showed that
Theorem 1.4 ([Bab14]). There exist two constants ǫ > 0 and c > 0 such that
QCp(WSNE(n, ǫ)) = 2
Ω(n), where p = 2−cn.
Given the result of Babichenko as above, the same exponential lower bound for the randomized
query complexity of ǫ-ANE, for small enough constant ǫ > 0, would follow immediately if
Given oracle access to G and any ǫ′-ANE of G, where ǫ′ = c(α) · ǫ for some constant c > 0
that only depends on α, there is a query-efficient procedure that outputs an ǫ-WSNE of G.
However, the best such procedure known is the following result from [DGP09]. The parameters are
subsequently improved in [Bab14], where the number of queries needed is also analyzed:
Given oracle access to G and any ǫ2/(16n)-ANE of G, there is a procedure that outputs
an ǫ-WSNE of G, where n is the number of players, using poly(α, n, 1/ǫ) payoff queries.
The procedure is very natural: For each player, reallocate probabilities on actions with a relatively
low expected payoff to a best-response action. By Theorem 1.4, such a procedure implies the same
exponential lower bound for ǫ-ANE [Bab14] but only when ǫ is O(1/n).
No better procedure is known. By definition, an ANE poses a slightly weaker condition on each
player compared to that of a WSNE. More specifically, given mixed strategies of other players x−i,
for an ǫ-WSNE, xi must be supported on actions that are ǫ-best responses to x−i, while in an
ǫ-ANE, xi can be any mixed strategy that yields an overall ǫ-best response to x−i. For example, xi
may put 1− ǫ probability on best-response actions while putting ǫ probability on any other actions.
On the one hand, this makes WSNE much easier to analyze and control in hardness reductions,
which is why it played a critical role in characterizing the complexity of Nash equilibria, starting
with the work of [DGP09], later in [CDT09] and subsequent works. On the other hand, as the ǫ
being of interest in [DGP09; CDT09] is either exponentially or polynomially small, any hardness
result for ǫ-WSNE yields the same result for ǫ-ANE (by combining the procedure of [DGP09]
described above and a folklore padding argument).
Our Approach
While we were not able to improve the procedure of [DGP09; Bab14], we prove Theorem 1.1 via a
query-efficient reduction from the problem of finding a WSNE to that of finding a ANE:
Given any α-action, n-player game G and any parameter ǫ > 0, one can define a new
α-action game G′ with a slightly larger set of O(α2 log(n/ǫ) · n) players such that
1. To answer each payoff query on G′, it suffices to make αn payoff queries on G;
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2. There is a procedure that, given any ǫ-ANE x of G′, outputs a (4αǫ)-WSNE y
of G, with no payoff oracle access to G or G′.
Our reduction is presented in Section 3. Theorem 1.1 then follows directly from the lower bound of
Babichenko [Bab14] on the randomized query complexity of WSNE (in Theorem 1.4). Theorem 1.3
follows from the fact that: 1) the payoff entries of G′ are easy to compute; and 2) the procedure to
obtain y from x runs in time polynomial in the length of the binary representation of x, when the
number of actions α is bounded.
Recall that in the procedure of [DGP09; Bab14], an ǫ-WSNE is obtained from an ǫ′-ANE with
ǫ′ = ǫ2/(16n) by reallocating probabilities on actions with relatively low expected payoff (formally,
actions with payoff Ω(ǫ) lower than the best response) to best-response actions. From the definition
of ANE, no player can have probability more than O(ǫ′/ǫ) = O(ǫ/n) on actions with low payoff in
an ǫ′-ANE. Thus, the procedure changes the expected payoff of each player on each action by at
most n ·O(ǫ/n) = O(ǫ) since it changes the mixed strategy of each player by O(ǫ/n). It follows that
the new mixed strategy profile is an ǫ-WSNE. The blow up of a factor of n from ǫ′ to ǫ is precisely
due to the cumulative impact on a player’s expected payoff imposed by small changes to all other
players’ mixed strategies.
Our reduction from WSNE to ANE overcomes this obstacle by constructing a new and slightly
larger game G′ with O(n log n) players, where each player i in the original n-player game G is now
simulated by a group of O(log n) players indexed by (i, j) in the new game G′. The payoff function
of player (i, j) in G′ is exactly the same as that of player i in G, but is defined with respect to the
aggregate action of each group of players in G′ by taking the majority among each group.
We then show that an ǫ-WSNE of G can be recovered from an ǫ′-ANE of G′, with ǫ′ = Ω(ǫ), by 1)
computing the distribution of the majority action of each group and 2) truncating the small entries
in each distribution. Intuitively, by focusing on the aggregate behavior of each group of O(log n)
independent players in G′, we make sure that the mixed strategies obtained from Step 1) are highly
concentrated on actions with close-to-best expected payoffs, and actions with low payoffs can only
appear as the majority action of a group with probability O(ǫ/n). Therefore in Step 2), we only need
to truncate entries with probability O(ǫ/n), and the remaining positive entries would correspond
to close-to-best actions. We can also control the effect of this truncation at the same time, because
when the number of actions are bounded, the aggregate behavior of each group changes by at most
O(ǫ/n). This allows us to show that the result is an ǫ-WSNE of the original game G.
Organization
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We first give formal definitions of ANE and WSNE in
Section 2. In Section 3 we present the reduction from WSNE to ANE for large games, and then use
it to prove Theorem 1.1 and Theorem 1.3 in Section 4. We conclude and discuss open problems in
Section 5.
2 Preliminaries
A game G is a triple (n, α,u), where n is the number of players, α is the number of actions for each
player, and u = (u1, . . . , un) are the payoff functions, one for each player. We always use [n] =
{1, . . . , n} to denote the set of players and [α] = {1, . . . , α} to denote the set of actions for each
player. Since we are interested in additive approximations, each ui maps [α]
n to [0, 1].
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Let ∆α denote the set of probability distributions over [α]. A mixed strategy profile of G is then
a tuple x = (x1, . . . ,xn) of mixed strategies, where xi ∈ ∆α denotes the mixed strategy of player
i. Given x, we use x−i to denote the tuple of mixed strategies of all players other than i. As a
shorthand, we write ui(x) to denote the expected payoff of player i with respect to x, and write
ui(a,x−i) to denote the expected payoff of player i playing action a ∈
[
α
]
with respect to x−i:
ui(x) = E
a∼x
[ui(a)] and ui(a,x) = E
b∼x−i
[
ui(a, b)
]
.
Next we define approximate and well-supported Nash equilibria.
Definition 1. Given ǫ > 0, an ǫ-approximate Nash equilibrium of an α-action and n-player game
G(n, α,u) is a mixed strategy profile x = (x1, . . . ,xn) such that for every player i ∈ [n]:
ui(x) ≥ ui(a
′,x−i)− ǫ, for all a
′ ∈ [α].
Definition 2. Given ǫ > 0, an ǫ-well-supported Nash equilibrium of G(n, α,u) is a mixed strategy
profile x = (x1, . . . ,xn) such that for every player i ∈ [n] and every action a in the support of xi:
ui(a,x−i) ≥ ui(a
′,x−i)− ǫ, for all a
′ ∈ [α].
Finally, we give a formal definition of succinct games [PR08].
Definition 3. An α-action succinct game is a pair (n,U), where n is the number of players and U
is a (multi-output) Boolean circuit that, given any pure strategy profile a ∈ [α]n (encoded in binary),
outputs the payoffs of all n players with respect to a in the game. The input size of (n,U) is the
size of the circuit U .
3 A Reduction from Well-Supported to Approximate
Nash Equilibria
Given an α-action, n-player game G(n, α,u) and ǫ ∈ (0, 1), we define a new game G′(sn, α,u′) with
sn players, where
s = 2α2 · ⌈ln(n/ǫ)⌉ .
We then show that, given an ǫ-ANE x of the new game G′, one can compute a (4αǫ)-WSNE y of G
without making any payoff queries to G or G′.
For each player i ∈ [n] in G, we introduce a group of s players in G′, indexed by (i, j) with
j ∈ [s], and use u′i,j to denote the payoff function of player (i, j). Given any pure strategy profile
a = (ai,j : i ∈ [n], j ∈ [s]), we define the payoff u
′
i,j(a) of player (i, j) as follows. First, for each
i ∈ [n], let a¯i ∈ [α] denote the majority action played by the i-th group (players (i, j), j ∈ [s])
in the pure strategy profile a (break ties by choosing the action with the smallest index). Write
a¯ = (a¯1, . . . , a¯n). Next, the payoff of player (i, j) under a is defined as
u′i,j(a) = ui(ai,j , a¯−i). (1)
This completes the definition of G′. The lemma below follows directly from the definition.
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Lemma 3.1. To answer a payoff query on G′, it suffices to make αn payoff queries on G.
Proof. By the definition of G′, u′i,j(a)’s for all (i, j), i ∈ [n] and j ∈ [s], are determined by(
ui(a
′, a¯−i) : i ∈ [n], a
′ ∈ [α]
)
,
for which αn payoff queries on G suffice.
We conclude our reduction by proving the following lemma:
Lemma 3.2. Given any ǫ-ANE x of G′, one can compute a (4αǫ)-WSNE y of G without making
any payoff queries on G or G′. Moreover, when α is a constant, the computation of y from x can
be done in time polynomial in the number of bits needed in the binary representation of x and 1/ǫ.
Proof. Let x = (xi,j : i ∈ [n], j ∈ [α]) be an ǫ-ANE of G
′. For each group i and action k ∈ [α], let
x¯i,k = Pr
a∼x
[a¯i = k] . (2)
Recall that a¯i is the majority action played by players (i, j), j ∈ [s], in the pure strategy profile a.
Then by definition, each x¯i = (x¯i,1, . . . , x¯i,α) is a probability distribution over [α].
Next we define a mixed strategy y = (y1, . . . ,yn) of G, and show that y is a (4αǫ)-WSNE. Let
ci,k =
{
x¯i,k if x¯i,k ≤ ǫ/n
0 otherwise
and yi,k =
x¯i,k − ci,k
1−
∑
j∈[α] ci,k
. (3)
It is clear that yi = (yi,1, . . . , yi,α) is a probability distribution over [α].
Now assume for contradiction that y is not a (4αǫ)-WSNE. Then for some player i ∈ [n], there
exists an action ℓ ∈ [α] such that yi,ℓ > 0 but
max
k∈[α]
ui(k,y−i) > ui(ℓ,y−i) + 4αǫ. (4)
But note that, the total variation distance between x¯j and yj for each j ∈ [n] is at most αǫ/n. So
by coupling and applying union bound, we have that∣∣ui(k, x¯−i)− ui(k,y−i)∣∣ ≤ (n− 1) · (αǫ/n) < αǫ, for all k ∈ [α]. (5)
It then follows from (4) and (5) that
max
k∈[α]
ui(k, x¯−i) > ui(ℓ, x¯−i) + 2αǫ. (6)
By the definition (1) of the payoff function u′i,j, we have
u′i,j(k,x−i) = ui(k, x¯−i), for all j ∈ [s] and k ∈ [α]. (7)
Combining (6) and (7), we have that for every player (i, j), j ∈ [s]:
max
k∈[α]
u′i,j(k,x−i)− u
′
i,j(ℓ,x−i) ≥ 2αǫ.
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Since x is an ǫ-ANE of G′, xi,j,ℓ ≤ 1/(2α). By Hoeffding bound and plugging in s = 2α
2 · ⌈ln(n/ǫ)⌉,
x¯i,ℓ = Pr
[
ℓ is the majority action among players (i, j), j ∈ [s]
]
≤ Pr
[
the number of players (i, j) playing ℓ is at least s/α
]
≤ e−s/(2α
2) ≤ ǫ/n.
By (3), this implies that yi,ℓ = 0, which contradicts our assumption and proves that y is indeed a
(4αǫ)-WSNE of G. From the definition of y, it is clear that the computation of y from x does not
require any payoff queries.
For the running time, when α is a constant, to compute x¯i,k in (2) one needs to go through
αs = α2α
2·⌈ln(n/ǫ)⌉ = (n/ǫ)O(1)
many pure strategy profiles of players (i, j), j ∈ [s]. Thus y can be computed in time polynomial in
the number of bits needed in the binary representation of x and 1/ǫ.
4 Proofs of Theorems 1.1 and 1.3
We use the query-efficient reduction given above to prove Theorem 1.1 and Theorem 1.3.
Proof of Theorem 1.1. By Theorem 1.4, there exist two constants ǫ′ > 0 and c′ > 0 such that
QCp′(WSNE(n
′, ǫ)) = 2Ω(n
′), where p′ = 2−c
′n′ .
Let n = 8n′ · ⌈ln(n′/ǫ′)⌉ and ǫ = 8ǫ′. It follows from Lemma 3.1 and Lemma 3.2 that
QCp′(ANE(n, ǫ)) ≥ QCp′(WSNE(n
′, ǫ)) = 2Ω(n
′).
The theorem then follows from n′ = Ω(n/ log n).
Proof of Theorem 1.3. From Lemma 3.2, it suffices to show that, given any α-action succinct game
G = (n,U), one can construct, in polynomial time, a Boolean circuit U ′ that implements the payoff
functions of players in G′. This can be done by following the definition of G′ in the previous section,
as the payoffs of a pure strategy profile a in G′ only depends (in a straight-forward fashion) on the
payoffs of αn = O(n) easy-to-compute profiles of G.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we present a simple and efficient reduction from the problem of finding a WSNE to
that of finding an ANE in large games with a bounded number of actions. Our results complement
the existing study on relations between WSNE and ANE. As an application, we obtain a lower
bound on the randomized query complexity of ǫ-ANE for some constant ǫ > 0. It would be
interesting to see other applications of our reduction in understanding the complexity of Nash
equilibria. It also remains an open problem to remove the log n factor in the exponent of our lower
bound, i.e. to show that the number of queries needed to reach an ǫ-ANE is indeed 2Ω(n). This
log n factor shows up because we simulate each player in the original game with O(log n) players
in the new game. Is there a more efficient simulation that uses fewer players?
8
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